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We apply transaction cost economic theory and perspectives in an empirical test
regarding purchasing performance using electronic marketplaces. Basically, buyers can
purchase products either by hopping across multiple electronic marketplaces or
maintaining close relationships with a particular electronic marketplace. We investigate
which is more beneﬁcial for a buyer organization’s purchasing performance in terms of
price reduction and purchasing eﬃciency. We undertake this task by developing
hypotheses and a research model and subjecting them to testing and analysis using the
purchase of maintenance, repair and operations products in a large and important
market, South Korea.
Introduction
Business-to-business (B2B) transactions for orga-
nizations and industries are a critical part of
doing business and management. However, such
transactions, and the relationships and diﬀeren-
tial beneﬁts between buyers and sellers, have
often been under-emphasized in the past. Also,
more recently such transactions themselves have
been radically transformed. This has been by
the development and spread of the Internet
allowing radically new ways of doing this parti-
cular aspect of business with the emergence of
on-line operations via electronic marketplaces
(e-marketplaces).1 An e-marketplace is a virtual
marketplace on the Internet where organiza-
tions can conduct economic transactions. These
e-marketplaces are seen as possibly generating
signiﬁcant beneﬁts for all the participants.
Besides this topicality, there are several further
reasons to investigate buyer–seller relationships
with e-marketplaces, including a lack of research.
First, most e-marketplace studies emphasize the
standpoint of market-makers or vendors, yet
buyers are also critically important. Second, there
is interest not only in the possibility of beneﬁts
emerging from e-marketplaces, but also their type
and if they are mutually exclusive. Third, the type
of relational governance structure of buyers–
sellers in e-marketplaces is crucial. Supply chain
management (SCM) studies traditionally concen-
trate on relational governance structures that
maintain long-term and close relationships with a
few suppliers, whereas short-term, market-based
governance structures also exist in e-market-
places. Fourth, most SCM studies focus on
purchasing direct materials, not indirect materials
such as maintenance, repair and operations
(MRO) items which are important to business.
Given the above, we can see that so far no
study has compared how purchasing MRO
products via diﬀerent e-marketplace governance
structures might produce varied beneﬁts with
Support from the Economic and Social Research
Council Advanced Institute of Management Interna-
tional Study Fellowship (2004, RES 331-27-0002) is
kindly acknowledged by Professor Rowley.
1Also known as web marketplaces, virtual marketplaces,
market-spaces, market-makers, electronic intermedi-
aries, exchanges and e-hubs (Bakos, 1997; Kaplan and
Sawhney, 2000; Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987).
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implications for businesses and management.
Therefore, our paper helps add detail to this
gap with the following research questions:
(1) What are the main beneﬁts of using e-
marketplaces for purchasing MRO products?
(2) What is the relationship between these beneﬁts
and are they simultaneously attainable?
(3) Are buyers better oﬀ committed to one or
multiple e-marketplaces for MRO procure-
ment?
To answer these questions our paper has six
further sections. Next we outline the speciﬁc
focus of our research and a brief overview of e-
marketplaces. The next section reviews the key
constructs and also introduces the research model
and hypotheses. The following section discusses
the research methodology, including the opera-
tional deﬁnitions of the constructs in our research
model. Analysis of the results and hypothesis
testing follow. The last sections provide a discus-
sion and some implications and conclusions.
Focus and overview of e-marketplaces
Purchasing in e-marketplaces is a huge area.
Therefore, we narrow down the topic of purchas-
ing in e-marketplaces in the following four ways:
in terms of type of organization, beneﬁt, relation-
ship and product. First, we are interested in
buyers rather than vendors. Second, we are
interested in beneﬁts in the purchasing area.
Popular measurements for purchasing perfor-
mance relate to cost, time and price (Gebauer and
Buxmann, 2000; Perlman, 1990). Perceptual
measures (e.g. satisfaction) are also used in
relation to quality, delivery, sales, after-sales
service and technical assistance (Cannon and
Perreault, 1999). We focus on purchasing price
and purchasing eﬃciency (Brunn, Jensen and
Skovgaard, 2002; Cannon and Homburg, 2001;
Choudhury and Hartzel, 1998; Noordewier, John
and Nevin, 1990). However, reducing purchasing
price while improving purchasing eﬃciency are
traditionally regarded as trade-oﬀs or contra-
dictory in oﬀ-line-based SCM. We are interested
whether e-marketplaces could help overcome this
trade-oﬀ in transaction cost economics (William-
son, 1975). Third, we are interested in the
implications for beneﬁts from diﬀerent types
of relationship (multiple, short, one-oﬀ versus
single, long-term, continuous) that buyers have
with e-marketplaces. For example, buyers can
conduct purchasing operations either by compar-
ing various bids across multiple e-marketplaces
(market exchange) or by maintaining close
relationships with particular e-marketplaces (re-
lational exchange). This typology follows the
traditional governance2 structure in transaction
cost economics (Williamson, 1975). Market ex-
changes tend to be short term and unrepeated
interactions and so buyers purchase by price,
taking advantage of the number of vendors.
Relational exchanges are long-term transactions
based on trust and close relationships and buyers
put less importance on price and show commit-
ment towards particular partners (Dwyer, Schurr
and Oh, 1987; Frazier, Spekman and O’Neal,
1988; Spekman and Johnston, 1986).3 Fourth, we
are interested in examining not all products but
MRO items in e-marketplaces.
There are about 1000 e-marketplaces globally
(Standing et al., 2006) and the portions of B2B
transactions through them are expected to reach
35% in 2006 (Granot and Sosic, 2005). e-
Marketplaces have been launched by private
ﬁrms and industry consortia. For example, Cisco
and Dell run their own private e-marketplaces to
sell their products while Harley-Davidson invites
multiple vendors’ bids on its private e-market-
place. Industry consortia include Covisint (auto
industry led by GM, Ford and Chrysler) and
Exostar (airplane industry led by Boeing).
Independent industry marketplaces, such as
ChemConnect, maintain a neutral position (for
neither buyer nor seller) to facilitate transactions
on their own sites.
These e-marketplaces can be used to purchase
products that are direct materials for ﬁnal
products or indirect materials, such as MRO
items. Even though about 80% of total purchasing
2The term ‘governance’ of e-marketplaces can otherwise
mean the possession of ownership or control (O’Reilly
and Finnegan, 2005), the status of neutrality, and seller-
side or buyer-side initiative (Brunn, Jensen and Skov-
gaard, 2002).
3Examples are horizontal and vertical integration, joint
ventures, collaborative R&D, collaborative logistics and
franchising. Pseudo-companies (Eccles, 1981; Luke,
Begun and Pointer, 1989), virtual integration (Zaheer
and Venkatraman, 1994) and re-intermediaries (Clem-
ons, Reddi and Row, 1993) are synonyms for this type
of governance.
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cost involves direct goods, indirect goods (such as
MRO) frequently purchased involve labour-
intensive information processing tasks (Laudon
and Traver, 2007). Furthermore, for most orga-
nizations MRO purchasing is irregular and ad
hoc (i.e. spot purchasing) so strategic purchasing
planning by demand forecasting has not been
possible. Eventually, most companies have diﬃ-
culties in controlling MRO spending from
centralized procurement oﬃces (Schneider,
2007). Indeed, e-marketplaces have been particu-
larly eﬀective for commodity products such as
MRO items (Campbell, Ray and Muhanna,
2005). Two of the largest MRO suppliers in the
world are McMaster-Carr and W.W. Grainger.
The W.W. Grainger website oﬀers more than
220,000 diﬀerent products (Schneider, 2007, p.
223). Oﬃce Depot and Staples are the market
leaders in oﬃce equipment. Digi-Key, InOne and
Global Computer Supplies sell electronic and
computer parts.
There are diverse dimensions in categorizing e-
marketplaces, such as stakeholder, business
domain, price mechanism, purchasing process,
openness, supported transactions, structure and
market mechanism (Grieger, 2003; Mahadevan,
2003; Skjott-Larsen, Kotzab and Grieger, 2003;
Standing et al., 2006). Among these categories we
focus on the category of vertical or horizontal
e-marketplaces. Vertical e-marketplaces are spe-
cialized in particular industries, such as compu-
ters, electronics, automobiles, chemicals or steel,
and provide vertically integrated services unique
to each industry, e.g. E-Steel, PaperExchange and
PlasticsNet.com. Horizontal e-marketplaces deal
with various kinds of items not conﬁned to a
particular industry. For example, TradeOut.com
helps clear surplus inventories by aggregating
vendors and buyers more eﬀectively than oﬀ-line
brokers. VerticalNet and MRO.com are other
examples here.
Model development
In this section we explain the development of our
hypotheses and research model. Figure 1 depicts
our research model and how governance struc-
ture with e-marketplaces inﬂuences purchasing
performance.
Relational exchange
A high degree of relational exchange with e-
marketplaces means a long-term and close rela-
tionship with particular e-marketplaces. A low
degree of relational exchange denotes short-
term and ad hoc transactions by a market-based
Relational
Exchange
Supply
Externality
Price
Reduction
System
Integration Purchasing
Efficiency
H2.1 H1
H2.2
H4.1
H3
H4.2
Figure 1. Research model
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mechanism (i.e. by moving across multiple e-
marketplaces and comparing as many vendors as
possible).
Price reduction
One of the major attractions of e-marketplaces
lies in the support of market search because
searching activities are costly (Choudhury and
Hartzel, 1998; Eisenmann, 2002; Malone, Yates
and Benjamin, 1987). If the buyer’s searching
cost is too high vendors can beneﬁt from
excessive rents by setting the selling price higher
than the buyer’s demand utility. In e-market-
places buyers can obtain more alternatives by
searching and comparing vendors’ electronic
catalogues and lowering the price by using
electronic auctions or reverse auction services
(Sarkar, Butler and Steinﬁeld, 1998). As well as
providing diverse alternatives in choice, e-mar-
ketplaces can help overcome the handicap of
small volumes in orders by aggregating identical
or similar orders. Thus, two incompatible bene-
ﬁts – diversity and volume – can be realized
simultaneously in e-marketplaces (Bakos and
Bailey, 1997). In a market exchange with multiple
e-marketplaces buyers are likely to purchase
products at lower prices than in a relational
exchange with particular e-marketplaces because
they can search and compare multiple e-market-
places, therefore increasing supply alternatives
(Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987).
The relationship between buyers and vendors
in e-marketplaces is diﬀerent from that in oﬀ-line
transactions. The move from market exchange to
relational exchange in oﬀ-line purchasing directly
leads to a reduction in the number of supply
alternatives, while that move in e-marketplaces
does not necessarily result in a direct reduction of
supply alternatives because even a single e-
marketplace still provides more supply alterna-
tives than oﬀ-line. However, it is plausible that a
buyer has a smaller number of vendors by
committing to a particular e-marketplace than
by moving around multiple e-marketplaces. In
general, compared to oﬀ-line transactions buyers
can purchase products at lower prices in e-
marketplaces by lowering search costs and
vendors’ monopolistic rents while accelerating
competition among vendors (Bakos, 1997; Mal-
one, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; Sculley and
Woods, 1999). However, purchasing price reduc-
tion is subject to the degree of relational exchange
that buyers choose for e-marketplaces.
Network externality
An e-marketplace helps realize economies of scale
and scope simultaneously by aggregating vendors
and buyers in the same place (Bakos and Bailey,
1997). The increased number of vendors reduces
variances in expected purchasing prices and
attracts more risk averters (Emmelhainz, 1990).
This phenomenon can be rephrased as: the
attractiveness of an e-marketplace from the
buyer’s standpoint is susceptible to network
externality, or the value of an e-marketplace is
in proportion to the number of vendors (Drie-
donks et al., 2002; Kauﬀman and Wang, 2001).
Network-related products, services and technol-
ogies have this positive network externality,
which means that the value and utility of the
network increases as the number of users rises
(Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Katz and Shapiro,
1994). Network externality in the form of current
installed base and expected installed base is often
observed as being an important driver of adop-
tion behaviour (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).
Depending on the type of network this
externality may be direct or indirect (Econo-
mides, 1996). Two-way networks such as tele-
phone, fax, e-mail and Internet chatting exhibit
direct network externality. Here an additional
customer provides direct externalities to all the
customers in the network where value is in direct
proportion to the number of users. For example,
in group-buying discount cyber-markets new
bidders care about the number of orders already
placed (Kauﬀman and Wang, 2001). Kauﬀman
and Wang (2001) called this positive network
externality ‘demand externality’.
In one-way networks, such as ﬁnancial ex-
change networks and credit cards, externality is
only indirect. For example, the number of credit
card users is not as important to credit card users
as the number of credit card terminals installed in
stores. Similarly, stock markets exhibit positive
size externality in the sense that the increasing
number of sellers in a stock exchange increases
the expected utility of buyer participants, even-
tually increasing the utility of all participants
(Diamond, 1982; Economides, 1996; Economides
and Siow, 1988; Garbade and Silber, 1976).
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An e-marketplace that involves two types of
player (i.e. buyers and vendors) exhibits one-way
network externality where the value of the e-
marketplace to buyers is dependent on the
number of vendors (Economides, 1996; Kauﬀ-
man and Wang, 2001; Yoo, Choudhary and
Mukhopadhyay, 2002) rather than the number of
buyers, sometimes referred to as ‘cross-network
externality’ (Bhargava and Choudhury, 2004).
Buyers beneﬁt as the participation of more
vendors drives down price. Vendors beneﬁt from
the size and diversity of buyers. This one-way
characteristic leads to a ‘chicken and egg’
dilemma regarding which one to entice to e-
marketplaces ﬁrst – buyers or vendors (Wise and
Morrison, 2000).
Due to an e-marketplace’s capability of in-
creasing the diversity of vendors, buyers come to
have higher expectations from participation. As
supply alternatives increase existing buyers enjoy
increased premiums without additional payments
(Kauﬀman and Wang, 2001) and they may also
expect lower prices. We refer to this phenomenon
as ‘supply externality’, where buyers beneﬁt from
free premiums stemming from an increased
number of supply alternatives. Supply externality
is expected to increase further if buyers move
between e-marketplaces to compare as many
vendors as possible. In other words, if buyers
stick to a particular e-marketplace they are giving
up the additional opportunity to increase supply
externality further, which can lower purchasing
price even more.
This formulation implies that increasing the
availability and number of vendors by moving
across multiple e-marketplaces is likely to help
reduce purchasing price further.4 Such incentives
are especially strong for low-end buyers who
appreciate the basic matching services of e-
marketplaces (Bhargava and Choudhury, 2004).
Thus, the probability is higher that buyers will
ﬁnd favourable oﬀers and lower purchasing prices
by using multiple e-marketplaces rather than
sticking to particular e-marketplaces. Therefore:
H1: Relational exchange will be negatively
related to price reduction.
H2: Supply externality mediates the eﬀect of
relational exchange on price reduction.
H2.1: Relational exchange will be negatively
related to supply externality.
H2.2: Supply externality will be positively related
to price reduction.
Purchasing eﬃciency
An e-marketplace can help buyers improve
purchasing operations by electronically using
the accumulated purchasing records of buyers
in negotiating with vendors (Williamson, 1975).
Such beneﬁts are more likely to be realized if
buyers maintain relational exchange with a
particular e-marketplace (Dwyer, Schurr and
Oh, 1987). Accumulated transaction records
and experience with buyers facilitates the net-
enabled innovation of the purchasing business
process for both vendors and e-marketplaces to
improve their customer satisfaction (Wheeler,
2002).
When buyers maintain a relational exchange
with a particular e-marketplace they can lower
time and costs required in purchasing operations
(Aldrich, 1979; Choudhury and Hartzel, 1998;
Hess and Kemerer, 1994), and can even stream-
line SCM, such as demand and inventory
management and forecasting (Eng, 2004). The
vendor’s learning from accumulated transaction
experience and adherence to ancillary services
can be the main reasons for this eﬀect. The
ancillary value-added services can range from
merchandising to transportation, ﬁnancing and
security (Bhargava and Choudhury, 2004).
System integration
Due to the openness and standard of the Internet,
system integration between organizations is
becoming easier. Such integration eﬀorts have
been extended to include e-marketplaces. For
Truman (2000) and many others, interface and
internal integration can be distinguished (Chat-
ﬁeld and Bjrn-Andersen, 1997; Hart and Saun-
ders, 1998; Riggins and Mukhopadhyay, 1994;
Srinivasan, Kekre and Mukhopadhyay, 1994;
Swatman, Swatman and Fowler, 1994). Interface
integration means integration between inter-
organizational systems and internal systems and
4We assume buyers can reduce purchasing price after
moving to e-marketplace purchasing. So, we used price
reduction as the measurement instead of price change.
Our data indicate that the average perceived price
reduction is 3.49 (on a Likert scale: 1, increase; 2, no
change; 3, slight decrease; 4, decrease; 5, heavy decrease)
and average percentage real price reduction is 10.7.
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can extend value chain activities for transactions,
information exchange and cooperation with
other companies (Devydov, 2001). Internal in-
tegration denotes integration between internal
systems. A typical example is Enterprise Re-
source Planning (ERP) systems integrated with
other legacy systems by Enterprise Application
Integration. System integration between vendors
and buyers ends up beneﬁting both ﬁnancially
(Barua et al., 2004). Such integration, for
example, can occur through the four dimensions
of inter-organizational activities: process; project
management; information and knowledge man-
agement and collaboration; communication
(Nambisan, 2003).
One of the advantages of system integration is
that redundant eﬀorts in data management can be
eliminated. Also, buyers can reduce the time and
costs of purchasing operations across searching
and ordering processes (Emmelhainz, 1990;
Ramsdell, 2000; Sokol, 1989). Furthermore, the
increasing demand for internal transparency in
proportion to the growth of businesses necessi-
tates the information system instrument (such as
e-marketplaces) to locate, monitor and investigate
various sources of ineﬃciencies and misdemea-
nours (Street and Meister, 2004). Therefore, a
relational exchange with e-marketplaces is more
likely to lead to information system integration so
that buyers can improve purchasing operations by
various automatic services (workﬂow, replenish-
ment, collaborative design etc.).
Meanwhile, searching for larger numbers
of vendors by skipping across e-marketplaces
produces negative inﬂuences on purchasing
operation eﬃciencies because each e-marketplace
may have its own procedures, conventions and
information systems, and these may not be
compatible. Due to such incompatibilities buyers
may maintain close relationships with particular
e-marketplaces and forge tight system integration
if their main concern is purchasing eﬃciency.
Such concerns are relatively explicit for high-
end buyers looking for substantially advanced
value-added services and intending to pay high
service fees (Bhargava and Choudhury, 2004).
Therefore:
H3: Relational exchange will be positively related
to purchasing eﬃciency.
H4: System integration mediates the eﬀect of
relational exchange on purchasing eﬃciency.
H4.1: Relational exchange will be positively
related to system integration.
H4.2: System integration will be positively related
to purchasing eﬃciency.
Research methods
In this section we explain the data collection
procedures and discuss the operationalization of
the major constructs in our research model.
Data collection
First, a quick overview of the Korean context is
given as business relations diﬀer from more
market-dominated economies. Korean compa-
nies traditionally depended on relational ex-
change rather than market exchange in B2B
transactions, especially as the country’s powerful,
large and diversiﬁed business conglomerates (the
chaebol) were major forces in economic growth.
Their hierarchical and relational B2B transac-
tions were the tradition and culture in the
economy. Interestingly, the government and
many commentators expected e-marketplaces
might help overcome some of the limitations
and pitfalls of such traditional B2B transactions.
There are many diﬀerent types of e-market-
places in Korea, among which MRO-based e-
marketplaces have been the most successful. We
focused on MRO e-marketplaces because they
are the most active type in Korea in terms of
growth rate, number of participants and volume
of transactions. For example, there are about 200
Korean e-marketplaces in cyberspace, albeit only
5% of them are running in the black (www.
etnews.co.kr, 24 March 2005). Among the top
players, MRO e-marketplaces dominate the
indirect-material-focused e-marketplaces in terms
of revenue, proﬁtability and number of customers
(www.etnews.co.kr). For example, iMarketkorea.
com, entob.com and ServeOne.co.kr are some
top Korean MRO e-marketplaces.
To ensure the validity of our research model
and questionnaire based on prior research, we
undertook a series of interviews with e-market-
places and their major client companies. Our
questionnaire was constructed, reviewed and
sometimes revised during these interviews. Our
unit of analysis is the purchasing department of
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buyer organizations that use e-marketplaces. We
constructed a list of more than 3000 MRO e-
marketplace users from newspapers, industry
magazines, e-marketplace websites and consult-
ing ﬁrms. After considering revenue size and
industry type to give enough diversity in our
sample, we contacted 329 companies from this
list via phone, fax, email or web bulletin boards.
We mailed surveys to managers of purchasing
departments and 184 valid replies were received
between September and October 2003, a 55.9%
valid return ratio. Tables 1 and 2 summarize their
proﬁles and distribution in terms of industry and
employee size as well as comparing them with the
total distribution of Korean companies.
Measure development and assessment
According to Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer
(2001) the choice between a formative and a
reﬂective speciﬁcation should be based primarily
on theoretical considerations. Our literature
review and interviews suggested the formative
measurement approach for the constructs of price
reduction, purchasing eﬃciency and supply ex-
ternality. Meanwhile, relational exchange and
system integration are measured by a single item.
The reasons why these constructs need to be
measured by formative indicators or can be
measured by a single item are discussed below
in the relevant sections.
Relational exchange. As noted above, e-market-
place governance can be split into two major
exchange types: market and relational (Dwyer,
Schurr and Oh, 1987; Frazier, Spekman and
O’Neal, 1988). However, transactions between
companies can have a mixture of both these
extreme governance types. In our research if
companies maintain a long-term and close
relationship with a particular e-marketplace they
have a higher degree of relational exchange.
Companies that purchased products by the
market mechanism have a lower degree of
relational exchange.
Following the literature, relational exchange
was measured diﬀerently by raters (individual,
expert or group) depending on the goods and
services transacted. For example, in the context
of consumer products, relational exchange was
measured by customer willingness to do business
continuously with a particular seller and to
recommend this seller to others (Sirdeshmukh,
Singh and Sabol, 2002). In the context of direct
materials relational exchange was measured by
one item of relationship duration for purchasing
(Kendall, 1999), by multiple items on levels of
cooperation, such as information sharing, joint
planning and joint problem solving (Gundlach
and Cadotte, 1994; Mohr and Spekman, 1994),
or by the exchange partners’ intention to main-
tain the relationship for the foreseeable future
(Heide and Miner, 1992).
To develop the items to properly measure the
degree of relational exchange in the context of
purchasing MRO products we interviewed pur-
chasing managers using e-marketplaces for MRO
products with regard to the appropriateness of
relationship duration, cooperation level and
willingness to maintain the relationship, all of
Table 1. Proﬁles of respondent companies
Industry Frequency Per cent Populationa
Manufacturing 52 28% 10.3%
Information and
communication
27 15% 0.3%
Education 26 14% 3.7%
Public service 21 12% 0.4%
Distribution 16 9% 28.1%
Finance 9 5% 1.1%
Construction 4 2% 2.6%
Othersb 8 4% 53.5%
No replies 21 11% –
Total 184 100%
aSource: Korea National Statistical Oﬃce. The total number of
companies in Korea was 3,187,916 as of the end of 2003.
bOthers include ﬁrst industry (agriculture, forestry, mining and
ﬁshery: 0.1%), public utilities (electricity, gas, water: 0.1%),
lodging and restaurant (20.3%), transportation (10.2%), real
estate (3.5%), services (2.6%), health (2.2%), entertainment
(3.8%), waste and maintenance (10.7%).
Table 2. Proﬁles of respondent companies by employment
Size (no. of
employees)
Frequency Per cent Populationa
Below 50 40 22% 69.3%
51–100 35 19% 8.9%
101–300 27 15% 9.6%
301–500 15 8% 3.5%
Above 501 46 25% 8.7%
No replies 21 11% –
Total 184 100%
aSource: Korea National Statistical Oﬃce. The total number of
employees in Korea was 14,729,166 as of the end of 2003.
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which derived from Dwyer, Schurr and Oh
(1987), Frazier, Spekman and O’Neal (1988,
1990), Gundlach and Cadotte (1994), and
Kendall (1999). Nearly every purchasing man-
ager identically recognized the degree of rela-
tional exchange as ‘the number of e-marketplaces
where to transact MRO products’ as a concrete
singular object (Rossiter, 2002). According to
Rossiter (2002) ‘concrete singular’ is when all
raters know the object as only one and, even
though the object is not a single object, it is
singular in the sense that it is a set of reasonably
homogeneous objects. In both cases above
only one item would be needed to represent the
object.
We also interviewed Chief Executive Oﬃcers
and e-marketplace experts to cross-check the
validity of our previous interviews, and gained
their veriﬁcation. As a result, one item to measure
six diﬀerent levels of relational exchange was
adopted and the survey respondents (purchasing
managers) were asked to choose one of them: not
pre-select e-marketplaces but purchase from a
random one in every transaction; select one e-
marketplace and continuously purchase at that e-
marketplace; select two e-marketplaces and
purchase after comparing them; select three e-
marketplaces and purchase after comparing
them; select four e-marketplaces and purchase
after comparing them; select more than four e-
marketplaces and purchase after comparing
them.5
Supply externality. In the context of two-way
networks, network externality has been measured
by such items as availability and replication of
song in peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing networks (Asva-
nund et al., 2004), the percentage market share of
a particular product in software markets (Gal-
laugher and Wang, 2002), the installed base of
network products (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer,
1996) and the numbers of participants in group-
buying discount auction markets (Kauﬀman and
Wang, 2001). However, in the context of a one-
way network like an e-marketplace, buyers and
sellers need to be recognized as counterparts (e.g.
Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Yoo, Choudhary and
Mukhopadhyay, 2002). In this case the utility of
buyers increases with the size of the seller network
rather than the size of the buyer network.
From the standpoint of the buyer who partici-
pates in an e-marketplace, its major attractiveness
is supply externality. Thus, we focus on supply
externality. As deﬁned earlier, supply externality is
the degree that buyers beneﬁt from free premiums
stemming from the increasing number of supply
alternatives that consist of vendors and their
products. Based on the literature and interviews
with purchasing managers we measured supply
externality by two items: vendors and products in
e-marketplaces. These measures were on a ﬁve-
point scale comparing moving from oﬀ-line to e-
marketplace purchasing: reduced; no change;
slight increase; increase; great increase (see the
Appendix). The middle point is termed ‘slight
increase’ because during our interviews we dis-
covered that the number of vendors or products
for buyers had increased in e-marketplaces com-
pared to oﬀ-line.
In e-marketplaces buyers appreciate the diver-
sity of both vendors and products. Our point is
not which aspect matters more, but that both
aspects constitute the construct of supply extern-
ality. Supply externality is a formative latent
variable because the number of vendors is not
necessarily correlated with the number of pro-
ducts. For example, in e-marketplaces where
spatial or time constraints are less serious than
oﬀ-line, even a single vendor can cover lots of
product items, and also many vendors can
compete over the same product item. As such,
we can conclude that the two indicators of supply
externality are not correlated with each other.
System integration. The measures of system
integration were based on interface and internal
integration (Truman, 2000). In a similar process
to the development process of the relational
exchange measure, nearly every purchasing man-
ager identically described system integration
as a ‘concrete singular object’ (Rossiter, 2002).
Through the interviews with purchasing man-
agers and e-marketplace experts we came up with
ﬁve levels of system integration between buyers
and e-marketplaces and respondents were asked
to choose one of them.
5One can assume that early users unfamiliar with e-
marketplaces purchase MRO products at one or a small
number of e-marketplaces. Thus, we adopted experience
with e-marketplaces as a control variable. As a result of
correlation analysis there was no meaning between
relational exchange and experience with e-marketplaces
(r5 0.021).
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The ﬁrst level is no system integration between
buyer and e-marketplace. The buyer places orders
in e-marketplaces and manages all the transaction
records on his/her own computer system. Second,
a buyer uses the accumulated but non-standar-
dized transaction records provided by e-market-
places. Buyers can partly control their own
purchasing performances by descriptive informa-
tion provided by e-marketplaces. Third, e-market-
places electronically send transaction records
weekly or monthly to buyers. This is the batch
mode of interface integration. Here e-market-
places and buyers make an agreement about data
format and regularly exchange transaction re-
cords by text or Excel ﬁles attached to emails.
Such system integration substantially reduces the
amount of purchase-processing tasks because
purchasing clerks can download and import ﬁles
into accounting information systems without
retyping data. Fourth, transaction records are
automatically imported and processed in a
buyer’s computer system connected to e-market-
places. This is complete interface integration. As a
buyer’s computer system is closely integrated with
an e-marketplace, all the purchasing transactions
are automatically and immediately reﬂected.
Fifth, all the transaction records obtained in e-
marketplaces are not only completely transferred
to a buyer’s computer system, but also used and
manipulated by all the other application pro-
grams such as sales, accounting, inventory and
distribution installed inside the buyer company.
This corresponds to internal integration. The
recent upgrade of ERP systems (extended ERP)
has this feature. In relation to Truman’s (2000)
typology of system integration, the third and
fourth levels correspond to interface integration
and the ﬁfth level to internal integration.
Purchasing performance. Purchasing perfor-
mance regarding MRO products can be mea-
sured by two aspects: direct product cost (price)
and acquisition cost (Cannon and Homburg,
2001; Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990). Direct
product cost is the actual price charged by
vendors for products sold to buyers. Acquisition
costs include the expenses related to ordering,
delivering and storing products, as well as the
expense of monitoring supplier performance and
coordinating and communicating with vendors.
Lowering such costs has been the primary
objective of SCM.
Through interviews with purchasing managers
and e-marketplace experts we identiﬁed that
purchasing performance can be measured by the
reduction of purchasing price (i.e. direct product
cost) and purchasing eﬃciency (i.e. acquisition
cost). In our measurement price reduction means
the degree of reduction of purchasing price
actually experienced after moving from oﬀ-line
to e-marketplace purchasing. We measured price
reduction by two items: perceived price reduction
and percentage of price reduction. Perceived price
reduction was measured by a ﬁve-point Likert
scale (1, increase; 2, no change; 3, slight decrease;
4, decrease; 5, heavy decrease). The middle point
is ‘slight decrease’ because during our interviews
we discovered that the price of products declined
in e-marketplaces after moving from oﬀ-line.
Price reduction is a formative latent variable
because these two indicators (i.e. perceived price
reduction and percentage of price reduction)
independently forge the construct of price reduc-
tion and also because a buyer’s perception of
price reduction can be diﬀerent from the percen-
tage of price reduction. For example, when a
buyer purchases an item A worth $10 at $5, they
save 50%. When a buyer purchases an item B
worth $1000 at $800, they save only 20%.
However, the amount of saving which a buyer
perceives is greater for item B (i.e. $200) than
item A (i.e. $5). As such, we can conclude that the
perceived price reduction is not necessarily
correlated with the percentage of price reduction.
Interviews with purchasing managers also ver-
iﬁed our conclusion.
In our study purchasing eﬃciency means the
degree to which purchasing department time and
eﬀort was saved after moving from oﬀ-line to
e-marketplace purchasing. We originally mea-
sured purchasing eﬃciency by four items: search-
ing time, ordering time, number of employees
and amount of work saved on a ﬁve-point Likert
scale (1, increase; 2, no change; 3, slight decrease;
4, decrease; 5, heavy decrease). For the same
reason as price reduction, the middle point in the
scale is ‘slight decrease’. Although each item
about purchasing time contributes to total
purchasing eﬃciency, items measuring a particu-
lar type of purchasing time are not necessarily
correlated. According to Cannon and Homburg
(2001) and Rossiter (2002) such measures are
best represented as the sum of the diﬀerent
components. Therefore, we evaluated the time
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dimension of purchasing operations by summing
up two components (i.e. searching and ordering)
of time.
Purchasing eﬃciency is a formative latent
variable because these indicators independently
constitute the latent variable of purchasing
eﬃciency. For example, a decrease of employee
numbers in the purchasing department does not
necessarily increase searching and ordering times.
Also, the number of employees can be in a trade-
oﬀ relationship with the amount of work. There-
fore, we can conclude that these indicators are
not necessarily correlated with each other.
Control variable: experience with e-market-
places. Purchasing performance can be inﬂu-
enced by other exogenous variables besides
relational exchange, supply externality and sys-
tem integration. We may assume that the more
experienced the buyer is with e-marketplaces, the
more eﬃcient purchasing operations are and the
less the purchasing price because the buyer can
save price, time and eﬀort due to trial and error
learning. Thus, we need to control for such
experience factors to assess relationships between
relational exchange, supply externality, system
integration and purchasing performance. We
operationalized buyer’s experience with e-mar-
ketplaces as the familiarity with conducting
purchasing operations in e-marketplaces that
Grewal, Comer and Mehta (2001) used (see the
Appendix). We also included control variables of
company size and industry as they are popular in
studies where the unit of analysis is the organiza-
tion. Number of employees was used as the
measure of company size. Company industries
identiﬁed in Table 1 were clustered into four
(manufacturing, information and communica-
tion, public services including education and
government, and others) due to the unbalanced
distribution of industry categories in our sample.
Analysis and results
To test our research model, partial least squares
(PLS) was conducted using PLS-Graph, Version
3.0 (Chin and Frye, 1998). The covariance matrix
for the measures is shown in Table 3. All the
latent variables have formative indicators so that
convergent validity was assessed by regression
coeﬃcients. Then discriminant validity was as-
sessed by examining loadings and cross-loadings
and the average variance extracted (AVE) by
each construct.
Formative indicators do not need to demon-
strate reliability by internal consistency because
they must have mutually exclusive eﬀects on
latent variables (Jarvis, MacKenzie and Podsak-
oﬀ, 2003). When the latent variable has a
reﬂective indicator, reliability can be investigated
by internal consistency indicators, such as Cron-
bach’s alpha or composite reliability. So, internal
consistency is not reported in our measurement
modelling. However, Lee and Hooley (2005)
caution us to distinguish reliability from internal
consistency. This is because for them ‘reliability is
concerned with the proportion of variance in a
measure, which is attributable to the true score
on the latent construct that is being measured. . . .
Thus, reliability is essentially a theoretical con-
cept, in that (practically speaking) we can never
be certain of the true score of a subject on a given
latent construct’ (p. 369), whereas internal con-
sistency means ‘the proportion of a scale’s total
variance that is attributable to a common source’
(p. 370). We believe that we explained thoroughly
enough in the previous section that all of our
Table 3. Covariance matrix
RE SE1 SE2 PR1 PR2 SI PE1 PE2 PE3
Relational exchange 1.553
Supply externality 1 –0.291 1.016
Supply externality 2 –0.284 0.737 1.025
Price reduction 1 –0.553 0.317 0.263 0.874
Price reduction 2 –2.874 1.332 0.851 4.942 68.698
System integration 0.185 0.004 0.020 –0.105 –0.224 0.467
Purchasing eﬃciency 1 0.310 0.059 0.009 –0.102 –0.846 0.176 1.112
Purchasing eﬃciency 2 0.551 0.016 –0.057 –0.248 –0.726 0.279 0.752 1.478
Purchasing eﬃciency 3 0.158 0.014 –0.063 –0.063 0.200 0.163 0.250 0.589 0.945
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measures of constructs are true (reliable) for-
mative indicators of relevant latent variables.
Measurement model
In a formative model the corresponding con-
structs are estimated by the linear aggregates of
their observed indicators. Thus, regression
weights (or coeﬃcients) can be used for the
judgement of convergent validity in contrast to
component loadings in a reﬂective model (Chin,
1998a, 1998b). A rule of thumb is to accept items
with regression weights of 0.7 or more (Carmines
and Zeller, 1979; Chin, 1998a, 1998b). Table 4
provides the result of convergent validity by
regression coeﬃcients. The standardized coeﬃ-
cients were high (4 0.70) and signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level (t values 42.58). The result suggested
suﬃcient convergent validity.
Table 5 presents AVE and inter-correlations
for discriminant validity. All AVE values were
well above the 0.50 recommended level (Chin,
1998a, 1998b; Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
Comparing the square root of AVE (i.e. the
diagonals in Table 5, representing the average
association of each construct to its measures)
with the correlations among constructs (i.e. the
oﬀ-diagonal elements in Table 5, representing the
overlap association among constructs) indicates
that each construct is more closely related to its
own measures than to those of other constructs
(diagonal elements should be larger than oﬀ-
diagonal elements). In sum, these results support
suﬃcient discriminant validity to allow an inter-
pretation of structural parameters.
Structural model
We ran four diﬀerent PLS models that connected
three control variables to each dependent vari-
able (supply externality, price reduction, system
integration, purchasing eﬃciency) in turn. How-
ever, we could not run the model where all
three control variables are connected to all
four dependent variables simultaneously due to
model under-identiﬁcation. We found that the
control variables of experience with e-market-
places, company size and industry were not
signiﬁcantly associated with the dependent vari-
ables except for the impact of experience on
purchasing eﬃciency. We conﬁrmed that our
research model can be analysed without control
variables. Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction
of the PLS results without the three control
variables.
The structural model was evaluated on the
basis of the R2 values, eﬀect sizes and structural
paths for each endogenous construct. Bootstrap-
ping was done to derive t statistics to assess the
signiﬁcance level of the model’s coeﬃcients and
Table 4. Convergent validity by regression coeﬃcients
Standardized
coeﬃcients
t statistic Signiﬁcance
level
Relational exchange (RE)
RE 1.00 0.00 0.00
Supply externality (SE)
SE1 0.94 33.50 0.00
SE2 0.94 33.68 0.00
Price reduction (PR)
PR1 0.70 13.14 0.00
PR2 0.99 166.42 0.00
System integration (SI)
SI 1.00 0.00 0.00
Purchasing eﬃciency (PE)
PE1 0.77 16.46 0.00
PE2 0.90 27.02 0.00
PE3 0.71 13.52 0.00
Table 5. Inter-construct correlations
Construct (no. of items) RE SE PR SI PE
Relational exchange (1) 1 – – – –
Supply externality (2) –0.246** 0.928a – – –
Price reduction (2) –0.444** 0.291** 0.898 – –
System integration (1) 0.217** 0.018 –0.131 1 –
Purchasing eﬃciency (3) 0.329** –0.002 –0.154* 0.351** 0.794
*Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level.
aThe boldface numbers on the diagonal are the square root of the variance shared between the constructs and their measures. Oﬀ-
diagonal elements are correlations among constructs. The diagonal is the square root of Sli
2/(Sli
21Sei); the composite reliability is
(Sli)
2/[(Sli)
21Sei]. In both cases, li are factor loadings and ei is the unique error variance 1 li2.
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to test the hypotheses. As shown in Figure 2 the
model explained a substantial amount of variance
for price reduction (R25 0.282) and purchasing
eﬃciency (R25 0.205), which were both greater
than the recommended 0.10 level (Falk and
Miller, 1992).
According to Chin (1998a, 1998b), in order to
estimate the predictive power of a predictor latent
variable the eﬀect size of each predictor latent
variable should be estimated.6 For this, supply
externality and system integration respectively
were omitted from the structural model and R2
values of price reduction and purchasing eﬃ-
ciency were recorded. Table 6 presents the R2
values and the eﬀect sizes. As recommended by
Cohen (1988), eﬀect size values of 0.02, 0.15 and
0.35 may be viewed as a gauge of whether a
predictor has a small, medium or large eﬀect at
the structural level. Table 6 demonstrates that the
partial mediation model has a medium eﬀect size
on the R2 value of price reduction and also a
medium eﬀect size on purchasing eﬃciency
compared to the non-mediation model. When
compared to the full mediation model the partial
mediation model had a large eﬀect size on the R2
value of price reduction and also a large eﬀect size
on purchasing eﬃciency. In sum, our research
model, which is the partial mediation model, was
assessed to be the most appropriate conceptualiza-
tion among those constructs in our model.
Relational
Exchange
Supply
Externality
Price
Reduction
System
Integration Purchasing
Efficiency
− 0.245**
(t=−3.593)
−0.415**
(t= −5.929)
0.245**
(t = 4.201)
0.217**
(t = 3.898)
0.301**
(t = 4.554)
0.279**
(t = 3.821)
Path coefficients with t values in parentheses 
**Significant at 0.01 level
R = 0.060
R = 0.282
R = 0.205
R = 0.047
Figure 2. Analysis results. Supply externality, price reduction and purchasing eﬃciency have the formative indicators
Table 6. Comparison of eﬀect size of partial, full and non-
mediation models
PR  SE PE  SI
Partial mediation model R2included 0.282 0.205
Full mediation model R2 0.122 0.125
(Compared to partial
model)
f2 0.567 0.390
(Compared to partial
model)
Eﬀect size large large
Non-mediation model R2excluded 0.227 0.136
(Compared to partial
model)
f2 0.195 0.337
(Compared to partial
model)
Eﬀect size medium medium
PR, price reduction; SE, supply externality; PE, purchasing
eﬃciency; SI, system integration.
6Eﬀect size can be calculated by f25 [R2(interaction
model) – R2(main eﬀects)]/R2(interaction model).
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As shown in Figure 2, the path coeﬃcient from
relational exchange to price reduction is –0.415
(t5 –5.929, po0.01), supporting H1. The path
coeﬃcient from relational exchange to supply
externality is –0.245 (t5 –3.593, po0.01), sup-
porting H2.1. The path coeﬃcient from supply
externality to price reduction is 0.245 (t5 4.201,
po0.01), supporting H2.2. Therefore, the med-
iating role of supply externality between rela-
tional exchange and price reduction (H2) is
veriﬁed. The path coeﬃcient from relational
exchange to purchasing eﬃciency is 0.301
(t5 4.554, po0.01), supporting H3. The path
coeﬃcient from relational exchange to system
integration is 0.217 (t5 3.898, po0.01), support-
ing H4.1. The path coeﬃcient from system
integration to purchasing eﬃciency is 0.279
(t5 3.821, po0.01), supporting H4.2. Therefore,
the mediating role of system integration between
relational exchange and purchasing eﬃciency
(H4) is veriﬁed.
In sum, all six hypotheses in our research
model were supported with empirical evidence.
However, two mediators (supply externality and
system integration) took a partial mediating role
because the direct paths from relational exchange
to purchasing performance were still signiﬁcant
even with the existence of these mediators. These
results demonstrate the possible existence of
additional mediators other than supply extern-
ality and system integration.
Discussion
This study started from the belief, based on
previous studies, that purchasing in e-market-
places improves purchasing performance. Buyers
can reduce purchasing price as they can decrease
search costs and compare more alternatives than
with oﬀ-line purchasing (Eisenmann, 2002; Sar-
kar, Butler and Steinﬁeld, 1998; Sculley and
Woods, 1999). Also, buyers can improve pur-
chasing eﬃciency by electronically processing
purchasing operations and using accumulated
purchasing records (Bakos and Bailey, 1997;
Choudhury and Hartzel, 1998; Williamson,
1975).7 We contribute to this ﬁeld as we show
that the relative strength of the two beneﬁts (price
reduction and purchasing eﬃciency) depends on
the governance structure (market versus rela-
tional). Thus, the more relational exchange, the
less price reduction, and supply externality
furthers this price reduction. Also, the more
relational exchange, the more purchasing eﬃ-
ciency, and system integration enhances this
purchasing eﬃciency. The only control variable
that had signiﬁcant impact was experience with e-
marketplaces. The more experienced buyers are,
the more they can improve purchasing eﬃciency
(but not purchasing price). This ﬁnding contains
signiﬁcant implications that e-marketplaces are
instruments to improve purchasing operations
rather than to reduce purchasing price as buyers
accumulate experience. This implication may well
be investigated in future longitudinal studies to
test which one of these beneﬁts appeals more or
which e-marketplaces survive over time.
The academic and theoretical implications of
our study include the following. First, studies of
e-marketplaces have traditionally taken the
standpoint of either market-makers (e.g. Brunn,
Jensen and Skovgaard, 2002; Mahadevan, 2003;
O’Reilly and Finnegan, 2005; Standing et al.,
2006) or vendors (e.g. Campbell, Ray and
Muhanna, 2005; Granot and Sosic, 2005; Zhu,
2004). Some studies proposed using e-market-
places as instruments for SCM (e.g. Eng, 2004;
Grieger, 2003; Skjott-Larsen, Kotzab and Grie-
ger, 2003), but ended up suggesting strategies for
e-marketplaces not buyers. Our study is one of
the rare studies of the buyer’s standpoint with the
focus on e-marketplace governance.
Second, indirect materials like MRO products
have attracted less attention from researchers
than direct materials because of lower costs,
inﬂuence on ﬁnal product quality and impact on
overall manufacturing operations. For example,
many presumed that direct materials cost more
and were more directly associated with ﬁnal
product quality and overall manufacturing op-
erations. However, as e-marketplaces enable
purchasing operations to be managed more
eﬃciently, the importance of eﬃciently managing
MRO products has increased substantially. Yet,
studies investigating how to improve the purchas-
7We proved the previous studies on purchasing perfor-
mance in our data analysis again, showing that price
reduction5 3.49, searching and ordering time5 2.7,
amount of work5 3.1, number of employees5 2.7 on
a Likert scale (1, increase; 2, no change; 3, slight
decrease; 4, decrease; 5, heavy decrease).
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ing operations of those MRO products are
scarce. The SCM area has focused more on
eﬃciently purchasing direct materials. Our study
is one of the few regarding purchasing operations
for MRO products.
Third, network externalities are largely dis-
cussed in the context of networks that have only
one type of member, e.g. users of a telephone
network (Bhargava and Choudhury, 2004). Yet,
e-marketplaces exhibit one-way network eﬀects
where the value of e-marketplaces to buyers is
dependent on the number of vendors (i.e. supply
externality) rather than the number of buyers.
The distinctive eﬀects of one-way networks have
been recognized in recent literature (Rochet and
Tirole, 2002, Yoo, Choudhary and Mukhopad-
hyay, 2002). This paper also contributes to this
emerging literature.
Thus, theoretical work in the area that
synthesizes these three areas (buyer perspectives,
indirect material purchases, network external-
ities) needs to be encouraged. This development
can also be in terms of integrating these and the
ideas of the variable eﬃcacy of B2B governance
mechanisms that are not an ‘either/or’ binary
choice of market or relational exchange, but
along a spectrum stretching from one to the other
resulting in a mixed and nuanced range of
options. In particular, theoretical development
needs to encompass the fact that businesses can
choose such appropriate e-marketplace govern-
ance mechanisms. This implies a contingency ﬁt
between objectives and that there should be
appropriate means for each objective. Once an
organization understands the right objective
regarding its purchasing activities it can pick
the most appropriate governance mechanism for
e-marketplaces and then strive to obtain the
necessary means to establish it. Without explicit
understanding of this issue organizations may not
be able to launch the most eﬀective purchasing
operations for e-marketplaces. This concern is
especially critical for MRO products that are not
necessarily strategic, but standardized, items
eligible for automatic transaction mechanisms,
like e-marketplaces.
Our results have the following practical im-
plications. First, we veriﬁed that there is a trade-
oﬀ between price reduction and purchasing
eﬃciency. An e-marketplace aggregates multiple
vendors in cyberspace and facilitates searching
and comparing alternatives through well-orga-
nized electronic catalogues. Buyers can reduce
purchasing price by adopting lower levels of
relational exchange with e-marketplaces (i.e.
maintaining market exchange with multiple e-
marketplaces), meanwhile sacriﬁcing the eﬃ-
ciency potential of purchasing operations. Or,
by adopting higher levels of relational exchange,
buyers can enhance purchasing eﬃciency due to
cooperation and operations routinization with
one or a small number of e-marketplaces.
Recently organizations have tried to incorpo-
rate value chains with their customers and launch
more collaborative commerce. Closer relational
exchange with e-marketplaces is a good strategic
choice in implementing such collaborative com-
merce. This trade-oﬀ implies that buyers need to
choose appropriate governance with e-market-
places that ﬁts their purchasing situations rather
than blindly conducting electronic purchasing.
Purchasing situations can be modelled (see
Figure 3) based on the level of purchasing price
and purchasing frequency.8 Purchasing frequency
is one of the critical issues involved with
purchasing operations eﬃciency because frequent
purchasing with the same vendor has been the
target for automation by computer systems.
When purchasing price is low with high fre-
quency, buyers can be better oﬀ by increasing the
degree of relational exchange. In cases where
purchasing price is high with low frequency,
Higher levels of 
relational exchange
High
Frequency 
Low 
Lower levels of 
relational exchange 
Low  Unit price  High 
↑
↓
← →
Figure 3. Appropriate e-marketplace governance
8We assume that e-marketplaces can help realize these
two independent objectives (unit price and purchasing
eﬃciency) simultaneously (high frequency–high price
cell). As we explained, these two objectives are two
extreme types with various continuous forms in the
middle. We left the high frequency–high price cell blank
just to understand the trade-oﬀ eﬀect of these two
extreme values.
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buyers may well lower the degree of relational
exchange.
Second, the value of e-marketplaces is realized
through supply externality and system integra-
tion. The more vendors join an e-marketplace,
the more favourable oﬀers are available, and the
more favourable oﬀers enable lower purchasing
prices in turn through competition between
vendors. On the other hand, higher relational
exchange with e-marketplaces facilitates more
system integration, and more system integration
eventually produces more purchasing eﬃciency.
Therefore, buyers need to seriously consider
system integration with e-marketplaces if their
main concern is improving purchasing opera-
tions. However, we found that supply externality
and system integration are partial mediators for
the respective beneﬁts of price reduction and
purchasing eﬃciency. Future studies need to
investigate additional mediators for each path
to e-marketplace beneﬁts.
As for purchasing operations, indirect materi-
als like MRO products are as important as direct
materials. Therefore, we call attention to indirect
materials for improving purchasing performance
and suggest taking a contingency approach in
selecting governance structures with e-market-
places. Also, we suggest longitudinal studies that
can further solidify the evidence of our ﬁndings.
Especially interesting would be to investigate
the changing inﬂuences of governance structure
on purchasing performance as e-marketplaces
mature.
Conclusion
Here we return to our research questions set out
in the Introduction.
(1) What are the main beneﬁts of using e-
marketplaces for purchasing MRO products?
Our study found these to be reduced prices
and increased eﬃciency in purchases for
buyers. e-Marketplaces help reduce purchas-
ing price through supply externality, and
improve the eﬃciency of purchasing opera-
tions through system integration with e-
marketplace systems.
(2) What is the relationship between beneﬁts and
are they simultaneously attainable? Our study
found these two beneﬁts can be simulta-
neously improved. However, we also found
that the relative strength of beneﬁts is subject
to the buyer’s governance type with e-
marketplaces.
(3) Are buyers better oﬀ committed to one or
multiple e-marketplaces for MRO procure-
ment? Our study found that buyers can be
better oﬀ in e-marketplaces with the appro-
priate governance: purchasing price is im-
proved with market-based governance and so
multiple e-marketplaces, whereas purchasing
eﬃciency is better with relational governance
and one e-marketplace.
We are not concerned with developing transac-
tion governance with vendors, but with e-market-
places. Each e-marketplace contains multiple
vendors at its site so that close relations with
a particular e-marketplace do not necessarily
lead to a tight link with a particular vendor.
An e-marketplace could work as a procurement
agent for buyers so the relationship between
buyer and vendor remains indirect. As agents
of procurement, e-marketplaces provide both
price reduction and purchasing eﬃciency.
Such beneﬁts are contradictory when buyers
directly contact vendors. Therefore, buyers have
reasons to use e-marketplaces as procurement
agents.
We also provide implications for the survival
of e-marketplaces: to realize both supplier
externality and system integration for buyers.
These seemingly contradictory beneﬁts (from
the perspective of oﬀ-line SCM) are possible in
e-marketplaces. The survivors in the competition
between e-marketplaces will be those which can
be better in helping both beneﬁts.
A major contribution of our paper is that it
takes the standpoint of the buyer and investigates
how e-marketplace clients can obtain beneﬁts.
This is the ﬁrst empirical study that explores the
trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts which results from the
governance mechanism with e-marketplaces. Our
study also complements traditional studies of the
procurement of direct materials. SCM in the
realm of indirect materials involves diﬀerent
transaction mechanisms, e.g. due to the high
standardization of items in transaction com-
pared to direct materials. We call for further
studies to pay more attention to this important
area of SCM.
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Appendix: Questionnaire
Relational exchange
How does your organization use e-marketplaces?
1 5 Selects one e-marketplace and continu-
ously uses that e-marketplace
2 5 Selects two e-marketplaces and purchases
after comparing them
3 5 Selects three e-marketplaces and purchases
after comparing them
4 5 Selects four e-marketplaces and purchases
after comparing them
5 5 Selects more than four e-marketplaces and
purchases after comparing them (in this case,
what is the number of e-marketplaces you are
using now?)
6 5Does not pre-select e-marketplaces but
purchases from a random one in every transaction
Supply externality
Please indicate the extent to which you, as a
manager of the purchasing organization, agree or
disagree with the following statements about
your experience in moving from oﬀ-line purchas-
ing to e-marketplace purchasing.
To what extent did the number of products
that you could choose increase?
15 reduced, 25 no change, 35 slight increase,
45 increase, 55 great increase
To what extent did the number of vendors that
you could choose increase?
15 reduced, 25 no change, 35 slight increase,
45 increase, 55 great increase
System integration
What is your organization’s level of system
integration with e-marketplaces?
15Use e-marketplaces only for making orders
while purchasing records are managed separately
by the purchasing company
25Use the accumulated transaction records
provided by e-marketplaces’ websites to manage
purchasing operations
35Receive a weekly or monthly transaction
record by email from e-marketplaces
45Automatic processing of transaction infor-
mation in the company’s internal program which
is connected to e-marketplaces
55Automatic processing of transaction infor-
mation in the company’s various internal pro-
grams that are all connected to e-marketplaces
(possibly an ERP system)
Purchasing performance
Please indicate the extent to which you, as a
manager of the purchasing organization, agree or
disagree with the following statements about
your experience in moving from oﬀ-line purchas-
ing to e-marketplace purchasing.
To what extent did your department decrease
purchasing price?
15 increase, 25 no change, 35 slight de-
crease, 45 decrease, 55 heavy decrease
By how much did you reduce purchasing price?
Please ﬁll in the blank.
( ) per cent
To what extent did your department reduce
searching time?
15 increase, 25 no change, 35 slight de-
crease, 45 decrease, 55 heavy decrease
To what extent did your department reduce
ordering time?
15 increase, 25 no change, 35 slight de-
crease, 45 decrease, 55 heavy decrease
To what extent did your department reduce the
number of employees?
15 increase, 25 no change, 35 slight de-
crease, 45 decrease, 55 heavy decrease
To what extent did your department reduce the
amount of work?
15 increase, 25 no change, 35 slight de-
crease, 45 decrease, 55 heavy decrease
Experience with e-marketplaces
What is your organization’s level of experience
with e-marketplaces?
15We have recently started to use e-market-
places and are beginning to learn how to do
business through them
25We have learned a lot about the way to do
business in e-marketplaces but there is still much
more to learn
35Our comfort level with doing business in e-
marketplaces is improving with every day
45We are comfortable with our e-market-
place operations and are aware of the ins and
outs of these operations. Our dealings with
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e-marketplaces are a regular part of our busi-
ness, and we think that there is not much new
to learn
55We do virtually no business through e-
marketplaces but are still listed as a member of an
e-marketplace and will continue to be listed with
an e-marketplace
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